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Abstract. We study a stochastic model of anonymous influence with conformist and anti-conformist
individuals. Each agent with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ initial opinion on a certain issue can change his opinion
due to social influence. We consider anonymous influence, which depends on the number of agents
having a certain opinion, but not on their identity. An individual is conformist/anti-conformist if his
probability of saying ‘yes’ increases/decreases with the number of ‘yes’-agents. We focus on three
classes of aggregation rules (pure conformism, pure anti-conformism, and mixed aggregation rules)
and examine two types of society (without, and with mixed agents). For both types we provide a
complete qualitative analysis of convergence, i.e., identify all absorbing classes and conditions for
their occurrence. Also the pure case with infinitely many individuals is studied. We show that, as
expected, the presence of anti-conformists in a society brings polarization and instability: polariza-
tion in two groups, fuzzy polarization (i.e., with blurred frontiers), cycles, periodic classes, as well
as more or less chaotic situations where at any time step the set of ‘yes’-agents can be any subset
of the society. Surprisingly, the presence of anti-conformists may also lead to opinion reversal: a
majority group of conformists with a stable opinion can evolve by a cascade phenomenon towards
the opposite opinion, and remains in this state.
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1 Introduction
This paper is devoted to anti-conformism in the framework of opinion formation with
anonymous influence. Despite the fact that anti-conformism plays a crucial role in many
social and economic situations, and can naturally explain human behavior and various
dynamic processes, this phenomenon did not receive enough attention in the literature.
The seminal work of DeGroot (1974) and some of its extensions consider a non-
anonymous positive influence in which agents update their opinions by using a weighted
average of opinions of their neighbors. However, in many situations, like opinions and
comments given on the internet, the identity of the agents is not known, or at least, there
is no clue on the reliability or kind of personality of the agents. Therefore, agents can be
considered as anonymous, and influence is merely due to the number of agents having a
certain opinion, not their identity. Fo¨rster et al. (2013) investigate such an anonymous so-
cial influence, but restrict their attention to the conformist behavior. They depart from a
general framework of influence based on aggregation functions (Grabisch and Rusinowska
⋆ Corresponding author.
(2013)), where every individual updates his opinion by aggregating the agents’ opin-
ions which determines the probability that his opinion will be ‘yes’ in the next period.
Instead of allowing for arbitrary aggregation functions, Fo¨rster et al. (2013) consider
anonymous aggregating. However, both frameworks of Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013)
and Fo¨rster et al. (2013) cover only positive influence (imitation), since by definition
aggregation functions are nondecreasing, and hence cannot model anti-conformism.
Our aim is to study opinion formation under anonymous influence in societies with
conformist and anti-conformist individuals. We focus on three classes of aggregation rules
that can be used by the agents when revising their opinions: pure conformism, pure anti-
conformism, and mixed aggregation rules. As a consequence, we distinguish three types of
agents: pure conformists who are more likely to say ‘yes’ when there are more agents who
said ‘yes’ in the last period, pure anti-conformists who are less likely to do so, and mixed
agents. All purely conformist agents are assumed to share the same minimum number
of ‘yes’ for them to say ‘yes’ with positive chance and the same minimum number of
‘yes’ for them to say ‘yes’ with chance of 1. Similarly, all purely anti-conformist agents
share the same minimum number of ‘yes’ for them to say ‘no’ with positive chance and
the same minimum number of ‘yes’ for them to say ‘no’ with chance of 1. We call these
four parameters the influenceability parameters. We consider two types of a society:
without mixed agents, and containing mixed agents. For both cases we provide a complete
qualitative analysis of convergence, i.e., we identify all absorbing classes and conditions
for their occurrence. This full characterization of the absorbing classes is based on the size
comparison among the four influenceability parameters and the number of conformists
and anti-conformists in the society.
Our findings bring precise answers to the following fundamental questions: What is
the impact of the presence of anti-conformists on a society being mainly conformist? Is a
chaotic or unstable situation possible? Is opinion reversal possible?
The exact description of the impact is done through our main Theorems 1 and 2,
giving all possible absorbing classes, that is, all possible states of the society in the long
run, and conditions of their existence. The complexity of these results, however, asks
for a further analysis which would extract the main trends. We have conducted such
an analysis, supposing that the size of the society is very large, and considering several
typical situations, e.g., the same influenceability parameters among the conformists and
anti-conformists, a small proportion of anti-conformists, etc. This permits to answer the
two other questions.
About the possibility of a chaotic or unstable situation, without much surprise, the
answer is positive. We have distinguished however several types of unstable situations,
ranked in increasing order of unstability: fuzzy polarization, cycle, fuzzy cycle and chaos.
Polarization is the well-known phenomenon where a part of the society converges to ‘yes’
and the other part to ‘no’. Obviously, this situation can arise here, with conformists and
anti-conformists having opposite opinion, provided the proportion of the latter is not too
high. Fuzzy polarization means that instead of having two stable groups, there is a kind
of oscillation around the groups of conformists and anti-conformists. When the set of
‘yes’-agents evolve according to a periodic sequence of subsets of the society, we speak
of a cycle. For instance, it is easy to see that the cycle Na, N c, Na, . . ., where Na, N c are
respectively the set of anti-conformists and the set of conformists, can arise, provided the
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number of anti-conformists is large enough. A fuzzy cycle is nothing other than a periodic
class in the theory of Markov chains. That is, there is a cycle of collections of subsets of
the society, and at each time step, a subset is picked at random in the collection under
consideration. Finally, chaos means that at each time step, any subset of the society can
be the set of ‘yes’-agents.
Finally, is opinion reversal possible? First, some explanation is necessary. In a purely
conformist society, there is quick convergence to a consensus, either on ‘yes’ or on ‘no’.
Therefore, the opinion remains constant for ever, and no change can occur. Opinion
reversal would mean that, starting from a state where a large majority of the society
has a stable opinion, there would be an evolution leading for that majority group to
the opposite opinion (cascade phenomenon). This is exactly what is most feared by,
e.g., politicians during some election, or any leader governing some society of individuals.
Surprisingly, such a phenomenon can occur, even with a small number of anti-conformists,
under certain circumstances that we describe precisely. Hence, contrarily to the intuition
which tells us that introducing anti-conformists is simply introducing unstability and
chaos, we have shown that it is quite possible to manipulate, by a suitable choice of the
influenceability parameters and the proportion of anti-conformists, the final opinion of
the conformists. We consider this result as one of the main findings of the paper.
Our framework is suitable for many natural applications. It can explain various phe-
nomena like stable and persistent shocks, large fluctuations, stylized facts in the industry
of fashion, in particular its intrinsic dynamics, booms and burst in the frequency of
surnames, etc. If fashion were only a matter of conformist imitation in an anonymous
framework, there would be no trends over time. Anti-conformism and anti-coordination
when individuals have an incentive to differ from what others do can also be detected,
e.g., in organizational settings. For example, the choice of a firm to go compatible or not
with other firms can be seen as a problem of anti-conformism. Anti-coordination can be
optimal when adopting different roles or having complementary skills is necessary for a
successful interaction or realization of a task in a team.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model
of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents and distinguish between two kinds
of a society: pure case (containing only pure anti-conformists and pure conformists) and
mixed case (including also mixed agents). We also explain how the present paper extends
and differs from our previous work on conformism. The convergence analysis of both cases
as well as of the pure case with the number of agents tending to infinity is provided in
Section 3. In Section 4 we deliver a brief overview of the related literature. We mention
some concluding remarks in Section 5. The proof of our main results on the possible
absorbing classes in the model is given in the appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Description of the model
We consider a society N with |N | = n agents who make a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision on some
issue (binary choice). Initially every agent has an opinion on that issue, but by knowing
the opinion of the others or by some social interaction, in each period the agent may
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modify his opinion due to mutual influence. In other words, there is an evolution in time
of the opinion of the agents, which may or may not stop at some stable state of the
society.
We define the state of the society at a given time as the set S ⊆ N of agents whose
opinion is ‘yes’. As usual, the cardinality of a set is denoted by the corresponding lower
case, e.g., s = |S|. Our fundamental assumption is that the evolution of the state is
ruled by a homogeneous Markov chain, that is, the state evolves at discrete time steps,
the new opinions depend only on the opinions among the society in the last period, and
the transition matrix giving the probability of all possible transitions from one state to
another is constant over time.
We study the opinion formation process of the society, where the updating of opinion
relies only on how many agents said ‘yes’ and how many said ‘no’ in the previous period,
disregarding who said ‘yes’ and who said ‘no’. For this reason we call this opinion for-
mation process anonymous. Both conformist and anti-conformist behaviors are allowed,
i.e., agents can revise their opinions by following the trend as well as in a way contrary
to the trend.
We now formalize the previous ideas. An (anonymous) aggregation rule describes for a
given agent how the opinions of the other agents are aggregated in order to determine the
updated opinion of this agent. Specifically, it is a mapping p from {0, 1, . . . , n} to [0, 1],
assigning to any 0 ≤ s ≤ n, representing the number of agents saying ‘yes’, a quantity
p(s) which is the probability of saying ‘yes’ at next time step (and consequently, 1− p(s)
is the probability of saying ‘no’). We focus on three classes of aggregation rules:
Ac = {p | p is nondecreasing and satisfies p(0) = 0 and p(n) = 1} (pure conformism)
(1)
Aa = {p | p is nonincreasing and satisfies p(0) = 1 and p(n) = 0} (pure anti-conformism)
(2)
and mixed aggregation rules:
Am = {p | p = αqc + (1− α)qa with α ∈ ]0, 1[ , qc ∈ Ac, qa ∈ Aa}. (3)
Note that p ∈ Am is not necessarily monotone, and that p(0) > 0 and p(n) < 1.
Let pi be agent i’s (anonymous) aggregation rule. Supposing that the update of opinion
is done independently accross the agents, the probability of transition from a state S to
a state T is
λS,T =
∏
i∈T
pi(s)
∏
i 6∈T
(1− pi(s)). (4)
Observe that, as the aggregation rule is anonymous, the probability of transition to T is
the same for all states S having the same size s.
We distinguish between three types of agents. We say that agent i is purely conformist
if pi ∈ A
c, purely anti-conformist if pi ∈ A
a, and is a mixed agent if pi ∈ A
m. The society
of agents is partitioned into
N = N c ∪Na ∪Nm
where N c is the set of purely conformist agents, Na the set of purely anti-conformist
agents, and Nm is the set of mixed agents. When Nm = ∅, we call it the pure case.
We make the following simplifying assumption: we suppose that all purely conformist
agents, although having possibly different aggregation rules, have in common the same
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minimum number of ‘yes’ for them to say ‘yes’ with positive chance, and the same mini-
mum number of ‘yes’ for them to say ‘yes’ with probability 1. Formally, we require that
for each i 6= j in N c,
min{s | pi(s) > 0} = min{s | pj(s) > 0} =: l
c + 1 (5)
min{s | pi(s) = 1} = min{s | pj(s) = 1} =: n− r
c. (6)
lc can be interpreted as the (maximum) number of ‘yes’ for which no effect on the proba-
bility of saying ‘yes’ arises, while rc is the (maximum) number of ‘no’ for which no effect
on this probability is visible (see Figure 1). This assumption permits to conduct a precise
analysis of convergence while remaining reasonable (it can be considered as a mean field
approximation).
p(s)
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
s
l
c
︷︸︸︷
r
c
︷ ︸︸ ︷ p(s)
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
s
l
a
︷ ︸︸ ︷
r
a
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p(s)
1
0.5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
s
Fig. 1. Typical aggregation rules for conformist agents (left), anti-conformists (center), and mixed agents (right)
with n = 10 agents. The latter is obtained by mixing the two first ones with α = 0.5
Similarly, we assume that all purely anti-conformist agents share the same minimum
number of ‘yes’ for them to say ‘no’ with positive chance and the same minimum number
of ‘yes’ for them to say ‘no’ with probability 1, i.e., for each i 6= j in Na,
min{s | pi(s) < 1} = min{s | pj(s) < 1} =: l
a + 1 (7)
min{s | pi(s) = 0} = min{s | pj(s) = 0} =: n− r
a. (8)
As above, la (respectively, ra) is the maximum number of ‘yes’ (respectively, ‘no’) for
which no effect on the probability of saying ‘yes’ is visible (see Figure 1).
These assumptions carry over mixed agents: any mixed agent i has an aggregation
rule pi which is a convex combination with coefficient αi of a conformist aggregation rule
(with fixed lc, rc) and an anti-conformist aggregation rule (with fixed la, ra). We allow,
however, that two mixed agents have different convex combination coefficients αi. Hence,
a mixed agent i can be seen as an agent who does not have a fixed behavior, but who is
conformist with probability αi and anti-conformist with probability 1− αi. On Figure 1,
we can see that a mixed agent with αi = 1/2 has a very indecisive behavior.
Based on the above assumptions, in this paper we fully characterize all possible ab-
sorbing classes based on size comparison among lc, rc, la, ra and the number of conformist
and anti-conformist agents in the society.
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2.2 Basic properties of the transition matrix
We recall that (see, e.g., Kemeny and Snell (1976); Seneta (2006)) for a Markov chain
with set of states E and transition matrix Λ and its associated digraph Γ , a class is a
subset C of states such that for all states e, f ∈ C, there is a path in Γ from e to f , and
C is maximal w.r.t. inclusion for this property. A class is absorbing if for every e ∈ C
there is no arc in Γ from e to a state outside C. An absorbing class C is periodic of period
k if it can be partitioned in blocks C1, . . . , Ck such that for i = 1, . . . , k, every outgoing
arc of every state e ∈ Ci goes to some state in Ci+1, with the convention k+1 = 1. When
each C1, . . . , Ck reduces to a single state, one may speak of cycle of length k, by analogy
with graph theory.
In our framework, states are subsets of agents and therefore classes are collections of
sets, which we denote by calligraphic letters, like C,B, etc. By definition, an absorbing
class indicates the final state of opinion of the society. For instance, if an absorbing class
reduces to a single state S, it means that in the long run, the society is dichotomous
(unless S = N or S = ∅, in which case consensus is reached): there is a set of agents S
who say ‘yes’ forever, while the other ones say ‘no’ forever. Otherwise, there are endless
transitions with some probability from one set S ∈ C to another one S ′ ∈ C.
We now study the properties of the transition matrix Λ, with entries λS,T , S, T ∈ 2
N ,
where λS,T is given by (4). Our aim is to find under which conditions one has a possible
transition from S to T , i.e., λS,T > 0. From (4), we have:
λS,T > 0⇔ [pi(s) > 0 ∀i ∈ T ] & [pi(s) < 1 ∀i 6∈ T ].
We start with the pure case, i.e., Nm = ∅. We first observe that pi(0) = 1 if i ∈ N
a
and 0 otherwise, and pi(n) = 1 if i ∈ N
c and 0 otherwise. Therefore, we have in any case
the sure transitions
λ∅,Na = 1, λN,Nc = 1.
Moreover, we get immediately from (5) to (8) for any s 6= 0, n,
(i ∈ N c) pi(s) > 0 ⇔ s > l
c (9)
pi(s) < 1 ⇔ s < n− r
c (10)
(i ∈ Na) pi(s) > 0 ⇔ s < n− r
a (11)
pi(s) < 1 ⇔ s > l
a. (12)
By combining these conditions and their negation in various ways, one can see that we
can only have transitions to ∅, N,Na, N c and any of the subsets or supersets of Na, N c.
A convenient notation here is the interval notation: for two sets S ⊆ T , [S, T ] denotes
the collection of sets K such that S ⊆ K ⊆ T . For instance, [∅, Na] and [Na, N ] denote
respectively the collection of subsets of Na and the collection of supersets of Na. Table 1
summarizes the possible transitions, adding also those from S = ∅ and S = N .
Let us introduce Z = (lc, rc, la, ra) and write pZi to emphasize the dependency of
pi on these parameters (and similarly for λS,T ). Equations (9) to (12) show striking
symmetries, in particular, when interchanging conformists and anti-conformists. Z being
given, we introduce the reversal of Z, Z∂ := (rc, lc, ra, la), and the interchange of Z,
Z ′ = (la, ra, lc, rc) which amounts to interchanging conformists with anti-conformists.
Considering these operations, we observe the following symmetries:
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0 ≤ s ≤ lc lc < s < n− rc n− rc ≤ s ≤ n
0 ≤ s ≤ la Na T ∈ [Na, N ] N
la < s < n− ra T ∈ [∅, Na] T ∈ 2N T ∈ [Nc, N ]
n− ra ≤ s ≤ n ∅ T ∈ [∅, Nc] Nc
Table 1. Possible transitions from S ∈ 2N in the pure case
(i) Interchange:
pZi (s) > 0 for i ∈ N
c ⇔ pZ
′
i (s) < 1 for i ∈ N
a
pZi (s) < 1 for i ∈ N
c ⇔ pZ
′
i (s) > 0 for i ∈ N
a
(idem with Na, N c exchanged)
(ii) Reversal:
pZi (s) > 0 for i ∈ N
c ⇔ pZ
∂
i (n− s) < 1 for i ∈ N
c
pZi (s) < 1 for i ∈ N
c ⇔ pZ
∂
i (n− s) > 0 for i ∈ N
c
(idem with Na, N c exchanged)
(iii) Interchange and reversal:
pZi (s) > 0 for i ∈ N
c ⇔ p(Z
∂)′
i (n− s) > 0 for i ∈ N
a
pZi (s) < 1 for i ∈ N
c ⇔ p
(Z∂)′
i (n− s) < 1 for i ∈ N
a
(idem with Na, N c exchanged)
The second case is of particular interest and leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (symmetry principle) Let S, T ∈ 2N and Z = (lc, rc, la, ra). The following
equivalence holds:
λZS,T > 0⇔ λ
Z∂
N\S,N\T > 0.
Proof. Letting λZS,T > 0 means that for every i ∈ N \ T , 0 ≤ p
Z
i (s) < 1, and for every
i ∈ T , 0 < pZi (s) ≤ 1. Using the equivalences in (ii), we find that for every i ∈ N \ T ,
0 < pZ
∂
i (n − s) ≤ 1 and for every i ∈ T , 0 ≤ p
Z∂
i (n − s) < 1. But this means that
λZ
∂
N\S,N\T > 0. ⊓⊔
Next we consider the mixed case, assuming pi = αiq
c+(1−αi)q
a with qc ∈ Ac, qa ∈ Aa
and fixed lc, rc, la, ra. We can easily derive the conditions for pi(s) to be 0 or 1, using (9)
to (12). For any 0 < s < n, we obtain
(i ∈ Nm) pi(s) = 0 ⇔ n− r
a ≤ s ≤ lc (13)
pi(s) = 1 ⇔ n− r
c ≤ s ≤ la, (14)
and 0 < pi(s) < 1 for all other cases. Finally, if S = ∅, then λS,T > 0 for every T ∈
[Na, Na ∪ Nm], and if S = N , then λS,T > 0 for every T ∈ [N
c, N c ∪ Nm]. Table 2
presents possible transitions from S ∈ 2N in the mixed case.
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0 ≤ s ≤ lc lc < s < n− rc n− rc ≤ s ≤ n
0 ≤ s ≤ la T ∈ [Na, Na ∪Nm] T ∈ [Na, N ] N
la < s < n− ra T ∈ [∅, Na ∪Nm] T ∈ 2N T ∈ [Nc, N ]
n− ra ≤ s ≤ n ∅ T ∈ [∅, Nc ∪Nm] T ∈ [Nc, Nc ∪Nm]
Table 2. Possible transitions from S ∈ 2N in the mixed case
2.3 Relation with the anonymous model of conformity
We recall the anonymous model of conformism (Fo¨rster et al. (2013)) and show that it
is equivalent to our class of conformist aggregation rules. By doing this we show that the
present model is a natural extension of Fo¨rster et al. (2013).
The assumption that agents modify their opinions in a Markovian way is basically
that underlying Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013). As the number of states is 2n, the size
of the transition matrix is 2n × 2n. In order to avoid this exponential complexity, like in
the present paper the latter reference uses a simple mechanism to generate the transition
matrix, based on aggregation functions, that is, nondecreasing mappings A : [0, 1]n →
[0, 1] satisfying A(0, . . . , 0) = 0 and A(1, . . . , 1) = 1. Specifically, supposing that agent i
aggregates opinions by the function Ai, the probability that agent says ‘yes’ at next time
step, given that S is the set of agents saying ‘yes’ at present, is given by
pi(S) = Ai(1S), (15)
where 1S is the indicator function of S, i.e., 1S(i) = 1 iff i ∈ S and 0 otherwise. This
model is presented and studied in general in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013).
The most common example of aggregation function, used, e.g., in DeGroot (1974), is
the weighted arithmetic mean
Ai(x) =
n∑
j=1
wijxj , (16)
where x = (x1, . . . , xn) and the w
i
j’s are weights on the entries, satisfying w
i
j ≥ 0 and∑n
j=1w
i
j = 1. The weight w
i
j represents to which extent agent i puts confidence on the
opinion xj of agent j. It depicts a situation where every agent knows the identity of every
other agent, and is able to assess to which extent he trusts or agrees with the opinion or
personal tastes of others.
Fo¨rster et al. (2013) investigate the model of conformism with anonymous social in-
fluence, which depends only on the number of agents with a certain opinion, not on their
identity. They use the ordered weighted averages (commonly called OWA operators, Yager
(1988)), which are the unique anonymous aggregation functions:
OWAw(x) =
n∑
j=1
wjx(j), (17)
where the entries x1, . . . , xn are rearranged in decreasing order: x(1) ≥ x(2) ≥ · · · ≥ x(n),
and w = (w1, . . . , wn) is the weight vector defined as above. Hence, the weight wj is not
assigned to agent j but to rank j, and thus permits to model quantifiers. For example,
taking w1 = 1 and all other weights being 0 models the quantifier “there exists”. Indeed,
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it is enough to have one of the entries being equal to 1 to get 1 as output. In our context,
it means that only one agent saying ‘yes’ is enough to make your opinion being ’yes’ for
sure. Similarly, “for all” is modeled by wn = 1 and all other weights being 0, and means
that you need that all agents (including you) say ‘yes’ to be sure to continue to say ‘yes’.
Intermediate situations can be modeled as well.
For the anonymous model of conformism, there exist two types of absorbing classes
(Fo¨rster et al. (2013)):
(i) any single state S ∈ 2N (including the consensus states ∅ and N);
(ii) union of intervals of the type [S, S ∪K], where S,K 6= ∅, N (recall that [S, S ∪K] =
{T ∈ 2N | S ⊆ T ⊆ S ∪K}).
For the second case, when the absorbing class is reduced to a single interval [S, S ∪K],
it depicts a situation in the long run where agents in S say ‘yes’, those outside S ∪ K
say ‘no’, and those in K oscillate between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ forever. Interestingly, no periodic
class can occur, although in general for arbitrary aggregation functions cycles can occur
(Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013)).
We now establish the relation with our framework. Supposing that agent i aggregates
opinions anonymously by OWAwi with weight vector w
i, we have from (15) and (17), for
any S ⊆ N :
pi(S) = OWAwi(1S) =
s∑
j=1
wij =: pi(s).
We see that pi(s) is an aggregation rule in the sense of Section 2.1, and that, due to
the properties of wi, pi ∈ A
c. Conversely, for any p ∈ Ac, we can define w ∈ Rn by
wj = p(j)− p(j− 1), j = 1, . . . , n, and by properties of p ∈ A
c, w is a well-defined weight
vector s.t. p ≡ OWAw. The introduction of the classes of aggregation rules A
a, Am are
therefore natural generalizations of the conformist model of Fo¨rster et al. (2013).
Note that the numbers lc, rc, la, ra defined in (5) - (8) correspond to the numbers of
left and right zeroes in the weight vectors of an OWA operator, for conformists and anti-
conformists, respectively. Moreover, the assumptions (5) - (8) simply mean that while
agents in N c (Na, respectively) may have different weight vectors, the number of left
and right zeroes is the same for all of them. The number of left/right zeroes indicates
how many people the agent needs in order to start being influenced towards the yes/no
opinion. In particular, a non symmetrical weight vector w.r.t. the number of left and right
zeroes means that the agent is biased towards the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, i.e., he needs a
different number of people to start being convinced to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
3 Convergence of the model
This section is devoted to the study of absorbing classes in the model introduced in
Section 2.1. Unlike the case of a model with only conformist agents, their study appears
to be extremely complex.
We start by the simple cases where there is no anti-conformist or no conformist agents.
Then we establish the main result (Theorem 1) giving all possible absorbing classes in
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the pure case (Nm = ∅), and continue with the mixed case, yielding similar results
(Theorem 2). These results are valid without any restriction on the number of agents
n, nor on any parameter describing the society. They give an exact description of all
possible absorbing classes (there are 20 classes), with their conditions of existence. In
order to make the results more readable, we then consider the number of agents tending
to infinity and propose some rewriting of the parameters describing the society. Doing so,
it happens that 4 absorbing classes among the 20 “disappear”, because they exist only as
limit cases. Based on that, we provide a clear analysis of the convergence in three typical
types of society.
Throughout, we will use the following notation: we write S → T if a transition from
S to T is possible, i.e., λS,T > 0, and S
1
→ T if λS,T = 1 (sure transition). We extend the
latter notation to collections of sets: letting S, T be two nonempty collections of sets in
2N , we write
S
1
→ T ⇔ ∀T ∈ T , ∃S ∈ S s.t. λS,T > 0 and ∀S ∈ S, ∀T 6∈ T , λS,T = 0.
3.1 Cases with no anti-conformists (Na = Nm = ∅) or no conformists
(N c = Nm = ∅)
We mentioned in Section 2.3 that for the anonymous model of conformism, it was found
that any state could be absorbing and that other absorbing classes are intervals of sets.
However, the case with Na = ∅ is much more particular as every agent has the same l, r,
and there are very few possibilities left, as shown below. To this end, it suffices to rewrite
Table 1 which becomes:
0 ≤ s ≤ lc lc < s < n− rc n− rc ≤ s ≤ n
∅ 2N N
It follows that only ∅, N are absorbing states and neither 2N nor any of its subcollections
is an absorbing class, because a transition from any S 6= ∅, N to ∅ or N is possible.
Both ∅, N are possible, regardless of the values of rc, lc. This means that the soci-
ety converges to a consensus, which depends on the initial state S. If s ≤ lc, there is
convergence to ’no’ in one step, and if s ≥ n − rc, there is convergence to ’yes’ in one
step.
The analysis of the extreme case with N c = ∅ is also done by rewriting Table 1 which
becomes now:
0 ≤ s ≤ la la < s < n− ra n− ra ≤ s ≤ n
N 2N ∅
Then there is only one absorbing class which is the cycle ∅
1
→ N
1
→ ∅. We see that,
without much surprise, a society of anti-conformist agents can never reach a stable state.
3.2 The pure case (Nm = ∅)
We observe the following basic facts:
(F0) ∅
1
→ Na, N
1
→ N c (as already observed).
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(F1) If S
1
→ T , S ′
1
→ T ′ and S ⊂ S ′, then T ⊆ T ′.
(F2) Applying (F0) and (F1), we find that in a transition S → T , ∅ ∈ S implies Na ∈ T
and N ∈ S implies N c ∈ T .
(F3) Consider S
1
→ T1
1
→ · · ·
1
→ Tp, with p ≥ 2. If S ⊆ T1, then S ⊆ T1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Tp.
(F4) 2N is a possible absorbing class. Indeed, take lc = rc = la = ra = 0. From Table 1 we
immediately see that for any S 6= ∅, N we have S
1
→ 2N . Since the power set of the
set of states is the “default” absorbing class when no other can exist, we exclude it
from our study and do not consider transitions to 2N .
(F5) From Table 1, we see that we have to deal only with the sets ∅, Na, N c, N and the
intervals [∅, N c], [∅, Na], [Na, N ], [N c, N ] (2N being excluded by (F4)), i.e., only these
can be constituents of an absorbing class. We put
B = {{∅}, {Na}, {N c}, {N}, [∅, N c], [∅, Na], [Na, N ], [N c, N ]}
the set of collections relevant to our study. Intervals not reduced to a singleton are
called nontrivial intervals.
(F6) S ⊆ 2N is an absorbing class if and only if S
1
→ S and S is connected (i.e., there is a
path (chain of transitions) from S to T for any S, T ∈ S).
(F6) will be our unique tool to find aperiodic absorbing classes, while periodic classes
are of the form S1
1
→ · · ·
1
→ Sp, with S1, . . . ,Sp ⊂ 2
N and being pairwise disjoint (no
common set between Si,Sj), and S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sp must be connected.
Since Nm = ∅, we have na = n − nc, where na = |Na| and nc = |N c|. Hence, the
model is entirely determined by lc, rc, la, ra, nc, n. We recall that these parameters must
satisfy the following constraints:
0 ≤ la + ra < n
0 ≤ lc + rc < n
0 < nc < n.
Based on these facts, we can show the main result of this section.
Theorem 1 Assume that Nm = ∅, Na 6= ∅ and N c 6= ∅. There are twenty possible
absorbing classes which are4:
(i) Either one of the following singletons:
(1) Na if and only if nc ≥ (n− lc) ∨ (n− la);
(2) N c if and only if nc ≥ (n− rc) ∨ (n− ra);
(ii) or one of the following cycles and periodic classes:
(3) Na
1
−→ ∅
1
→ Na if and only if n− lc ≤ nc ≤ ra;
(4) N c
1
−→ N
1
−→ N c if and only if n− rc ≤ nc ≤ la;
(5) Na
1
−→ N c
1
−→ Na if and only if nc ≤ lc ∧ la ∧ rc ∧ ra;
(6) ∅
1
−→ Na
1
−→ N c
1
−→ ∅ if and only if nc ≤ rc ∧ ra ∧ lc and nc ≥ n− ra;
(7) Na
1
−→ N
1
−→ N c
1
−→ Na if and only if nc ≤ lc ∧ la ∧ rc and nc ≥ n− la;
(8) Na
1
−→ [∅, N c]
1
−→ Na if and only if nc ≤ lc ∧ la ∧ ra and rc < nc < n− lc;
4 We use the standard notation ∨ and ∧ to denote max and min, respectively.
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(9) N c
1
−→ [Na, N ]
1
−→ N c if and only if nc ≤ rc ∧ ra ∧ la and lc < nc < n− rc;
(10) [∅, N c]
1
−→ [Na, N ]
1
−→ [∅, N c] if and only if rc ∨ lc < nc ≤ ra ∧ la ∧ (n − lc − 1) ∧
(n− rc − 1);
(iii) or one of the following intervals or union of intervals:
(11) [∅, Na] if and only if (n− lc) ∨ (ra + 1) ≤ nc < n− la;
(12) [N c, N ] if and only if (n− rc) ∨ (la + 1) ≤ nc < n− ra;
(13) [∅, Na] ∪ [∅, N c] if and only if lc ≥ n − ra and nc ∈
(
]rc, n− lc[ ∩ ]la, n− rc[
)
∪((
]la, n− ra[ ∪ ]lc, n− rc[
)
∩ ]0, rc]
)
;
(14) [Na, N ] ∪ [N c, N ] if and only if la ≥ n − rc and nc ∈
(
]lc, n− rc[ ∩ ]ra, n− lc[
)
∪((
]ra, n− la[ ∪ ]rc, n− lc[
)
∩ ]0, lc]
)
;
(15) [∅, Na] ∪ {N c} if and only if lc + rc = n − 1, ra ≥ rc, lc > la and la < nc <
(n− ra) ∧ (n− lc);
(16) [N c, N ] ∪ {Na} if and only if lc + rc = n − 1, la ≥ lc rc > ra and ra < nc <
(n− la) ∧ (n− rc);
(17) [∅, N c] ∪ {Na} if and only if la + ra = n − 1, lc ≥ la, nc < n − rc and nc ∈
]rc, n− lc[ ∪ ]lc, rc];
(18) [Na, N ] ∪ {N c} if and only if la + ra = n − 1, rc ≥ ra, nc < n − lc and nc ∈
]lc, n− rc[ ∪ ]rc, lc].
(19) [∅, Na] ∪ [N c, N ] if and only if lc + rc = n− 1 and la ∨ ra < nc ≤ lc ∧ rc;
(20) 2N otherwise.
Moreover, if lc + rc = n − 1, then cases (6), (7), (8), (13) and (14) become impossible
while (15) and (16) are specific to this case, and if la + ra = n− 1, then cases (11) and
(12) become impossible, while (17) and (18) are specific to this case.
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the appendix.
A complete analysis and interpretation of these results seems to be out of reach. Nev-
ertheless, this becomes quite possible and instructive when considering special situations
(see below). We recall that these results are given without any simplifying assumption
and are valid whatever the value of the parameters describing the society. Once they are
known, Theorem 1 immediately gives the possible absorbing classes. We stick in what
follows to general comments, reserving more specific ones and a deeper analysis to the
particular situations studied hereafter:
(i) Although there are many absorbing classes, they can be grouped in three categories.
The first category ((1) and (2)) comprises absorbing states (singleton classes) and
represent a stable state of the society in the long run, which happens to be a polariza-
tion: a part of the society says ’yes’ (the anti-conformists in case (1), the conformists
in case (2)), while the other part says ’no’. Observe that consensus never occurs.
The second category (from (11) to (20)) comprises aperiodic classes which are not
reduced to singletons. (11) and (12) are simple cases where the class is an interval.
For (11), it means that in the long run all the conformists say ‘no’, while the anti-
conformists have a chaotic behavior, in the sense that, at each time step, a (different)
fraction of them says ’yes’ while the remaining part says ’no’. We may call this a fuzzy
polarization. Cases (13) through (18) can be interpreted in a similar way, although the
behavior is yet more chaotic: taking (13) for example, in the long run, at each time step
the set of agents saying ’yes’ can be any fraction of anti-conformists or any fraction
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of conformists (but not a mixed group). We may call this a chaotic polarization. The
extreme case of chaotic behavior is given by (20): at any time step in the long run,
the set of agents saying ’yes’ can be any subset of agents.
The third category (from (3) to (10)) comprises cycles and periodic classes, which also
have a natural interpretation. Cycles (from (3) to (7)) are succession in time of states
of polarization and/or consensus, endlessly in the same order. Periodic classes ((8) to
(10)) mix the cyclic behavior with intervals as in the case of fuzzy polarization, and
for this reason may be called fuzzy cycles. For example, in case (8) at some step in
the long run all anti-conformists say ‘yes’, in the following step they all say ‘no’ but a
fraction of conformists says ‘yes’, then in the next step again all anti-conformists say
‘yes’, etc.
(ii) Cases (1) to (20) are not exclusive. This can immediately be seen by considering cases
(1) and (2). Indeed, for a given society, which is represented by the set of parameters
n, nc, la, ra, lc and rc, under some conditions both cases (1) and (2) are possible,
and therefore two different absorbing classes might occur, Na and N c. However, the
process will end up in only one of them, with some probability.
(iii) The analysis for conformists and anti-conformists is not symmetric. For example,
[∅, Na] is a possible absorbing class but not [∅, N c]. However, while there is no sym-
metry between “a” and “c” in this framework, there exists symmetry between S and
N \ S as pointed out in Lemma 1.
3.3 The case of only mixed agents (Nm = N)
Prior to the study of the mixed case, we consider the situation where the society is formed
only by mixed agents: N = Nm. It is easily done by using Eqs. (13) and (14):
pi(s) = 0⇔ n− r
a ≤ s ≤ lc
pi(s) = 1⇔ n− r
c ≤ s ≤ la
which permits to rewrite Table 1:
0 ≤ s < n− rc n− rc ≤ s ≤ la la < s ≤ n
0 ≤ s < n− ra 2N N 2N
n− ra ≤ s ≤ lc ∅ does not occur ∅
lc < s ≤ n 2N N 2N
We can see that ∅, N are not absorbing states, hence the only absorbing class is 2N .
3.4 The (general) mixed case (Nm 6= ∅)
Next, we consider a society in which pure conformists, pure anti-conformists, and mixed
agents co-exist, i.e., n = na + nc + nm, with na > 0, nc > 0 and nm > 0. We get the
following result.
Theorem 2 Assume that Nm 6= ∅, Na 6= ∅ and N c 6= ∅. Let N
a
= Na ∪ Nm and
N
c
= N c ∪Nm. There are twenty possible absorbing classes which are:
(i) Either one of the following intervals:
(1) [Na, N
a
] if and only if nc ≥ (n− lc) ∨ (n− la);
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(2) [N c, N
c
] if and only if nc ≥ (n− rc) ∨ (n− ra);
(3) [∅, N
a
] if and only if (n− lc) ∨ (ra + 1) ≤ nc < n− la;
(4) [N c, N ] if and only if (n− rc) ∨ (la + 1) ≤ nc < n− ra;
(ii) or one of the following periodic classes:
(5) [Na, N
a
]
1
−→ ∅
1
→ [Na, N
a
] if and only n− lc ≤ nc ≤ ra − nm;
(6) [N c, N
c
]
1
−→ N
1
−→ [N c, N
c
] if and only if n− rc ≤ nc ≤ la − nm;
(7) [Na, N
a
]
1
−→ [N c, N
c
]
1
−→ [Na, N
a
] if and only if nc + nm ≤ lc ∧ la ∧ rc ∧ ra;
(8) ∅
1
−→ [Na, N
a
]
1
−→ [N c, N
c
]
1
−→ ∅ if and only if nc+nm ≤ rc∧ ra∧ lc and nc ≥ n− ra;
(9) [Na, N
a
]
1
−→ N
1
−→ [N c, N
c
]
1
−→ [Na, N
a
] if and only if nc + nm ≤ lc ∧ la ∧ rc and
nc ≥ n− la;
(10) [Na, N
a
]
1
−→ [∅, N
c
]
1
−→ [Na, N
a
] if and only if nc + nm ≤ lc ∧ la ∧ ra and rc − nm <
nc < n− lc;
(11) [N c, N
c
]
1
−→ [Na, N ]
1
−→ [N c, N
c
] if and only if nc + nm ≤ rc ∧ ra ∧ la and lc − nm <
nc < n− rc;
(12) [∅, N
c
]
1
−→ [Na, N ]
1
−→ [∅, N
c
] if and only if lc ∨ rc < nc + nm ≤ ra ∧ la ∧ (n− (lc +
1)) ∧ (n− (rc + 1));
(iii) or one of the following unions of intervals:
(13) [∅, N
a
] ∪ [∅, N
c
] if and only if lc ≥ n− ra and
nc ∈
(
]rc − nm, n− lc[∩]la, n− rc[
)
∪
((
]la − nm, n− ra[∪]lc − nm, n− rc[
)
∩]0, rc − nm]
)
;
(14) [Na, N ] ∪ [N c, N ] if and only if rc ≥ n− la and
nc ∈
(
]lc − nm, n− rc[∩]ra, n− lc[
)
∪
((
]ra − nm, n− la[∪]rc − nm, n− lc[
)
∩]0, lc − nm]
)
;
(15) [∅, N
a
] ∪ [N c, N
c
] if and only if lc + rc = n − 1, rc ≤ ra, lc > la, nc < n − lc and
la < nc + nm < n− ra;
(16) [N c, N ] ∪ [Na, N
a
] if and only if lc + rc = n− 1, lc ≤ la, ra < rc, nc < n− rc and
ra < nc + nm < n− la;
(17) [∅, N
c
] ∪ [Na, N
a
] if and only if la + ra = n − 1, lc ≥ la, nc < n − rc and nc ∈
]rc − nm, n− lc[ ∪ ]lc − nm, rc − nm[;
(18) [Na, N ] ∪ [N c, N
c
] if and only if la + ra = n − 1, rc ≥ ra, nc < n − lc and
nc ∈ ]lc − nm, n− rc[ ∪ ]rc − nm, lc − nm[;
(19) [∅, N
a
] ∪ [N c, N ] if and only if lc + rc = n− 1 and la ∨ ra < nc ≤ lc ∧ rc;
(20) 2N otherwise.
The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 1 and is omitted here, but is available
upon request.
Theorems 1 and 2 lead to clear conclusions concerning the comparison of absorbing
classes in the pure and mixed cases. First of all, when mixed agents exist in a society,
a polarization into two groups (one saying ‘yes’ and another one saying ‘no’, which was
the case under Nm = ∅) is not possible anymore. However, under the same conditions as
before (see cases (1) and (2) in Theorem 1), Na and N c are now replaced by [Na, N
a
]
and [N c, N
c
]. In other words, while anti-conformists (conformists, respectively) continue
saying ‘yes’ and conformists (anti-conformists, respectively) say ‘no’ forever, the new
type of individuals – mixed agents – oscillate between ‘yes’ and ‘no’. In the pure case,
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two (simple) intervals [∅, Na] and [N c, N ] (cases (11) and (12) in Theorem 1) are possible
absorbing classes. With the presence of mixed agents, we have the corresponding intervals
[∅, N
a
] and [N c, N ] (cases (3) and (4) in Theorem 2) under the same conditions as in the
pure case. This means that while conformists do not change their behavior when mixed
agents join the society and say either ‘no’ (absorbing class [∅, N
a
]) or ‘yes’ (absorbing
class [N c, N ]) forever, now besides anti-conformists also mixed agents oscillate. Another
consequence of the presence of mixed agents on possible absorbing classes is that cycles
(i.e., periodic classes with only single states, cases (3) through (7) in Theorem 1) are not
possible anymore. Instead, we have eight periodic classes with mixed agents oscillating
(cases (5) till (12) in Theorem 2) that correspond to absorbing classes (3) - (10) of
Theorem 1. The conditions for the existence of these periodic classes in the mixed case
are the same as the ones for the corresponding ‘pure’ cases, but adjusted by the presence
of nm mixed agents. Finally, the unions of intervals in the mixed case (absorbing classes
(13) till (18) in Theorem 2) correspond to the unions of intervals (13) till (18) in the pure
case (Theorem 1), but again with mixed agents oscillating and the conditions taking into
account nm.
3.5 Analysis of the pure case when n tends to infinity
We make the assumption that the number of agents is very large and approximate this
situation by making n tend to infinity. For notational convenience, each of the previous
parameters na, la, ra, lc, rc is now divided by n, keeping (with some abuse) the same
notation for these parameters, so that now these are real numbers in [0, 1]. It follows
that
nc = 1− na
la + ra < 1
lc + rc < 1,
Note that the particular cases la + ra = n− 1, lc + rc = n− 1 appearing in classes (15)
to (19) become limit cases la + ra → 1, lc + rc → 1, making the latter classes appearing
only as limit cases.
We study in details in the rest of this section some specific situations. Observe that
from the results of Section 3.1, the “model” is not continuous in na at 0, in the sense
that if na > 0, we have proved that 2N can be an absorbing class (it suffices to take
lc = rc = la = ra = 0). Similarly, it is not continuous in na at 1.
Given an aggregation rule with l, r specified, we introduce the new parameter
γ =
1
1− r − l
,
which is the average slope of the function giving the probability p to say ’yes’ given
the number of agents saying ‘yes’. l indicates how much an agent needs agents saying
‘yes’ before starting to change his mind (this could be called the firing threshold), while γ
measures the reactiveness once he has started to change his mind. Note that γ ∈
[
1
1−l
,∞
[
.
On the other hand, 1−r is the saturation threshold, beyond which there is no more change
of opinion for the agent. In a dual way, r can be interpreted as how much an agent needs
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agents saying ‘no’ before starting to change his mind, while 1−l is the saturation threshold
beyond which additional agents saying ‘no’ have no effect.
The pair of parameters (l, γ) may be easier to interpret than the pair (l, r), and so we
will use it in the sequel whenever convenient. We have r = 1− l − 1
γ
.
In what follows, we make a detailed analysis and interpretation of the convergence in
several typical situations. We assume throughout Nm = ∅.
Situation 1: la = lc = l and ra = rc = r. This depicts a society where all agents,
conformists or anti-conformists, have the same influenceability characteristics. Among
the initially 15 possible absorbing classes, only the following ones remain possible:
– Na if and only if na ≤ l
– N c if and only if na ≤ r
– cycle Na
1
→ N c
1
→ Na if and only if na ≥ 1− l and na ≥ 1− r
– 2N otherwise.
Let us translate this with the pair (l, γ). We obtain:
(i) Na if and only if na ≤ l
(ii) N c if and only if na ≤ 1− l − 1
γ
(iii) cycle Na
1
→ N c
1
→ Na if and only if na ≥ 1− l and na ≥ 1
γ
+ l
(iv) 2N otherwise.
We make a “phase diagram” with the three parameters na, l, γ showing the possible
absorbing classes, keeping in mind that γ ≥ 1
1−l
.
l
1
na
1
(a)
Na
2N
cycle N
1
→ ∅
1
→ N
N, ∅
l
1
na
1
(b)
γ
5 91
1−l
= 1
na
1
(c)
γ
5 91
1−l
na
1
(d)
l
1
1− l
γ
5 91
1−l
na
1
1
(e)
1− l
l
Fig. 2. Phase diagram for Situation 1: (a) γ has minimum value 1
1−l
(r = 0); (b) γ →∞; (c) l = 0; (d) l ∈ [0, 1/2];
(e) l ∈ [1/2, 1[. Color code: white=2N , blue=cycle, red=Nc, green=Na
We comment on these phase diagrams.
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– The two first cases (i) and (ii) of absorbing classes are “polarization”, the last case (iv)
is “chaos” (no convergence). The extreme cases (na = 0 or 1) are already commented
(see Section 3.1). Also, it can be checked that when γ tends to infinity, the limit cases
(15) to (19) do not appear as the existence conditions become contradictory.
– When na increases from 0 to 1, we go from consensus, next to polarization, next to
chaos, and finally to a cycle.
– When the firing threshold l is very low (c), there is a cascade effect leading to a
polarization where all conformist agents say ‘yes’, which increases with reactiveness.
Indeed, suppose that all agents say ‘no’. Then, as l is very low, all anti-conformists start
to say ‘yes’, which make gradually the conformists saying ‘yes’. If na is not too large,
the conformists rapidly reach the consensus ‘yes’. Otherwise, as anti-conformists will
say ‘no’ again, the non-negligible proportion of ‘no’ causes trouble in the convergence
and a chaotic situation may appear. As the reactiveness increases, the chaotic behavior
is less and less probable.
– Similarly, when the firing threshold is high (e), there is a cascade effect leading all
conformists to say ‘no’, if the proportion of anti-conformists is not too small but less
than the firing threshold. Indeed, suppose that all agents say ‘yes’ at some time. Then
all anti-conformists will say ‘no’. As the firing threshold is high, some conformists will
start to say ‘no’, and there will be more and more. At the same time, as the number
of ‘yes’ in the society is decreasing, the anti-conformists will gradually change to ‘yes’.
The situation of polarization remains stable unless the number of anti-conformists
exceeds the firing threshold, in which case a chaotic situation (or even a cycle) occurs.
– (d) shows an intermediary situation where both cascades can occur. The higher the
firing threshold, the higher the probability to have a cascade of ‘no’ among the con-
formists. The two cases (c) and (e) show how, in a society of conformists, the opinion
can be manipulated by introducing a relatively small proportion of anti-conformists.
The final opinion depends essentially on the firing threshold.
Situation 2: la = ra and lc = rc. Here, there is a symmetry between l and r. As men-
tioned before, this means that agents treat in the same way ‘yes’ and ‘no’ opinions. This
assumption might be relevant for instance when voting for two candidates. However, it
might not be relevant when saying ‘yes’ means ‘adopting a new technology’, where a
bias towards a status quo or a bias towards technology adoption makes sense. Under this
assumption, the possible absorbing classes are:
– Na, N c iff na ≤ la and na ≤ lc (referred hereafter as “polarization”)
– cycle Na
1
→ N c
1
→ Na iff na ≥ 1− la and na ≥ 1− lc (referred hereafter as “cycle”)
– periodic class [∅, N c]
1
→ [Na, N ]
1
→ [∅, N c] iff na ≥ 1− la and lc < na < 1− lc (referred
hereafter as “fuzzy cycle”)
– [∅, Na], [N c, N ] iff na ≤ lc and la < na < 1− la (referred hereafter as “fuzzy polariza-
tion”)
– 2N (referred hereafter as “chaos”) otherwise.
It can be checked that in the limiting case where γa, γc tend to infinity, classes (15) to
(19) are not possible since then la = lc = 1/2 which makes the conditions of existence
contradictory.
Figure 3 gives four cuts of the phase diagram with the three parameters na, la, lc. Recall
that here la, lc vary in [0, 1/2[, and γa = 1
1−2la
, γc = 1
1−2lc
. Note that the polarization at
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la
1/2
na
1
(a)
la
1/2
na
1
1− lc
lc
lc
(b)
la
1/2
na
1
1/2
(c)
Fig. 3. Phase diagram for Situation 2: (a) lc = 0; (b) lc ∈ ]0, 1/2[; (c) lc → 1/2. Color code: white=chaos,
blue=cycle, cyan=fuzzy cycle, red=polarization, green=fuzzy polarization
na = 0 becomes a consensus (either N or ∅). As before, the cycle at na = 1 is N
1
→ ∅
1
→ N .
Some comments about these phase diagrams:
– Compared to Situation 1, the chaos case takes a relatively large area, which grows
as lc or la tend to 0 (agents have a low firing threshold, but a low reactiveness). In
particular, it can be observed that when conformist agents have a low reactivity, a
very small proportion of anti-conformists in the society suffices to make it chaotic.
– Contrarily to Situation 1, there is no cascade effect. Indeed, the absorbing states Na
and N c always appear together, hence both are possible with some probability, or both
are impossible. This polarization effect happens if the anti-conformists are not “seen”
by the conformists (their number stay below the firing threshold), and all the more
since the anti-conformists are reactive. Less reactive anti-conformists have a tendency
to provoke fuzzy polarization.
– As for Situation 1, cycles and fuzzy cycles happen all the more since the number
of anti-conformists is growing. A limit phenomenon happens when la, lc, na tend all
together to 1/2: a kind of “triple point” appears (see (c)), in the sense that the three
types of behavior (polarization, fuzzy polarization and cycle) happen together, which
is also visible for Situation 1 (Figure 2(b)). Observe that the mix of polarization and
fuzzy polarization are nothing else than the limit classes (15) and (16). According to
Theorem 1, they happen iff lc, la → 1/2 and na = 1/2, which is exactly the locus of
this triple point.
Situation 3: The case where na tends to 0. Let us put na = ǫ > 0, arbitrarily small.
Therefore, nc = 1−ǫ. This case is the most plausible in real situations, as anti-conformists
can be reasonably thought of forming a tiny part of the society. The crucial question is
however to know whether this tiny part can have a non-negligible effect on the opinion
of the society.
The first task is to see which of the 15 classes remain possible. One can check that:
– (1) Na iff lc ∧ la ≥ ǫ;
– (2) N c iff rc ∧ ra ≥ ǫ;
– (3) Na
1
→ ∅
1
→ Na iff lc ≥ ǫ and ra ≥ 1− ǫ;
– (4) N c
1
→ N
1
→ N c iff rc ≥ ǫ and la ≥ 1− ǫ
– Classes (5) to (10) are impossible;
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– (11) [∅, Na] iff la < ǫ, lc ≥ ǫ and ra < 1− ǫ;
– (12) [N c, N ] iff ra < ǫ, rc ≥ ǫ and la < 1− ǫ;
– (13) [∅, Na] ∪ [∅, N c] iff lc < ǫ, rc < ǫ and ra > 1− ǫ;
– (14) [Na, N ] ∪ [N c, N ] iff lc < ǫ, rc < ǫ and la > 1− ǫ;
– (20) 2N otherwise.
Keeping in mind that ǫ is small, we can provide the following interpretation of the above
absorbing classes: (1) and (2) are consensus to ‘no’ and ‘yes’, respectively, up to the
negligible fraction of anti-conformists. (3) is almost the same as (1), while (4) is almost
the same as (2). Also, (11) and (12) are almost the same as (1) and (2), respectively. (13)
is a chaotic situation with mainly a tendency to ‘no’ for the society, while (14) is also a
chaotic situation, but with a tendency of ‘yes’.
From this analysis, we can draw the following conclusions:
– Suppose that the conformists have lc, rc > ǫ: this means that they cannot “see” the
anti-conformists. Then (1), (2) are together possible as soon as ra, la > ǫ (the anti-
conformists do not react to themselves). On the border area where la or ra is smaller
than ǫ, classes (3) and (11) (almost consensus ‘no’) or classes (4) and (12) (almost
consensus ‘yes’) appear. The situation is made clear by looking at Figure 4 (recall that
la + ra < 1). Observe that in all parts of the triangle, both consensus ‘yes’ and ‘no’
la
1ǫ
ra
1
ǫ
Fig. 4. Phase diagram for Situation 3, with lc, rc > ǫ. Color code: green=Na, red=Nc, cyan=almost consensus
‘no’ ((3) or (11)), blue=almost consensus ‘yes’ (4) or (12)
coexist. Therefore, no cascades of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ may occur. Also, no cycle nor chaotic
behavior is possible, and we conclude that this situation is almost identical to the
situation where no anti-conformist is present.
– Suppose that the conformists have very small lc, rc (< ǫ), which means that they react
to the anti-conformists. Then most of the classes become impossible, in particular
Na, N c, and only (13) (if ra is large enough), and (14) (if la is large enough) remain.
Otherwise, we get 2N (see Figure 5). In this case, no consensus is possible, even in a
weak sense, and only chaotic situations arise.
4 Related literature
In this section we briefly mention some related literature different from our previous
works recalled in Section 2.3.
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la
11− ǫǫ
ra
1
1− ǫ
ǫ
Fig. 5. Phase diagram for Situation 3, with lc, rc < ǫ. Color code: blue=chaotic ‘no’ (13), cyan=chaotic ‘yes’
(14), white=chaos (20)
Opinion conformity has been studied widely in various fields and settings, and by
using different approaches; for surveys, see e.g., Jackson (2008); Acemoglu and Ozdaglar
(2011). A subset of this literature focuses on various extensions of the DeGroot model
(DeGroot (1974)), see e.g., DeMarzo et al. (2003); Jackson (2008); Golub and Jackson
(2010); Bu¨chel et al. (2014, 2015); Grabisch et al. (2017), and for a survey, e.g., Golub and Sadler
(2016). So far, the analysis of the anti-conformist behavior is much less common than the
study devoted to the phenomenon of conformism.
Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010a,b) address the problem of measuring negative in-
fluence in a social network but only in one-step (static) settings. Bu¨chel et al. (2015)
study a dynamic model of opinion formation, where agents update their opinion by av-
eraging over opinions of their neighbors, but might misrepresent their own opinion by
conforming or counter-conforming with the neighbors. Although their model is related
to DeGroot (1974), it is very different from our framework of anonymous influence with
conformist and anti-conformist agents. Moreover, the authors focus on the relation be-
tween an agent’s influence in the long run opinion and network centrality, and on wisdom
of the society, while we determine all possible absorbing classes and conditions for their
occurrence.
Konishi et al. (1997) present a setting completely different from the present paper
but related to our definition of anti-conformist agents. They consider a non-cooperative
anonymous game in which one of the assumptions on individuals’ preferences is partial
rivalry, implying that the payoff of every player increases if the number of players who
choose the same strategy declines. The authors examine the existence of strong Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies for such a game with a finite set of players, and then with
continuum of players.
There are several other works that study network formation and anti-coordination
games, i.e., games where agents prefer to choose an action different from that chosen
by their partners. Our approach is different from anti-coordination games, in particular,
because we have an essential dissymmetry between agents. Bramoulle´ (2007) investigates
anti-coordination games played on fixed networks. In his model, agents are embedded in a
fixed network and play with each of their neighbors a symmetric anti-coordination game,
like the chicken game. The author examines how social interactions interplay with the
incentives to anti-coordinate, and how the social network affects choices in equilibrium.
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He shows that the network structure has a much stronger impact on the equilibria than
in coordination games. Bramoulle´ et al. (2004) study anti-coordination games played on
endogenous networks, where players choose partners as well as actions in coordination
games played with their partners. They characterize (strict) Nash architectures and study
the effects of network structure on agents’ behavior. The authors show that both network
structure and induced behavior depend crucially on the value of cost of forming links.
Lo´pez-Pintado (2009) extends the model of Bramoulle´ et al. (2004) which is one-sided to
a framework in which the cost of link formation is not necessarily distributed as in the
one- or two-sided models, but is shared between the two players forming the link. She
introduces an exogenous parameter specifying the partition of the cost and characterizes
the Nash equilibria depending on the cost of link formation and the cost partition.
Kojima and Takahashi (2007) introduce the class of anti-coordination games and in-
vestigate the dynamic stability of the equilibrium in a one-population setting. They fo-
cus on the best response dynamic where agents in a large population take myopic best
responses, and the perfect foresight dynamic where agents maximize total discounted
payoffs from the present to the future.
Cao et al. (2013) consider the fashion game of pure competition and pure coopera-
tion. It is a network game with conformists (‘what is popular is fashionable’) and rebels
(‘being different is the essence’) that are located on social networks (a spatial cellular
automata network and small-world networks). The authors run simulations showing that
in most cases players can reach a very high level of cooperation through the best response
dynamic. They define different indices (cooperation degree, average satisfaction degree,
equilibrium ratio and complete ratio) and apply them to measure players’ cooperation
levels.
Our setting can be applied to some existing models, like herd behavior and information
cascades (Banerjee (1992); Bikhchandani et al. (1992)) which have been used to explain
fads, investment patterns, etc.; see Anderson and Holt (2008) for a survey of experiments
on cascade behavior. Although Bikhchandani et al. (1992) have already addressed the
issue of fashion, the present model takes a different turn, since we assume no sequential
choices and some agents are anti-conformists while others are conformists. In the model of
herd behavior (Banerjee (1992)) agents play sequentially and wrong cascades can occur.
Though it can be rational to follow the crowd, some anti-conformists may want to play a
mixed-strategy: either following the crowd or not. This is particularly true under bounded
rationality. Agents may not be able to know what is rational, for example because they
lack information or do not have enough time or computational capacities. As a conse-
quence, they may play according to rules of the thumb like counting how many people
said ‘yes’ rather than computing bayesian probabilities. Chandrasekhar et al. (2016) show
in a lab experiment that people tend to behave according to the DeGroot model rather
than to Bayesian updating; see also Celen and Kariv (2004). This is also consistent with
Anderson and Holt (1997) who show that counting is the most salient bias to explain
departure from Bayesian updating.
5 Concluding remarks
Clearly, the present paper has taken a different road than the references mentioned in
Section 4. We analyze a process of opinion formation in a society with different types of
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agents: pure conformists, pure anti-conformists, and mixed agents. We focus on anony-
mous influence, where a change of an agent’s opinion depends on the number of agents
with a certain opinion and not on their identities. We determine all possible absorbing
classes and conditions for their occurrence for the society without mixed agents as well
as for the mixed case. Moreover, the analysis of a very large society in different types of
situations is provided.
First of all, our study confirms and puts in precise terms what the intuition says to
us: the introduction of anti-conformists in a society, even in a very small proportion,
prevents from reaching a consensus and causes either polarization or various instabilities:
cycles, chaotic behavior, etc. Our study has shown that, even under some simplifying
assumptions (the parameters lc, rc, la, ra are supposed to be the same for every agent in a
category), the convergence issue is very complex and many (up to 20) different situations
can occur. Despite this apparent complexity, we have managed to draw some general
and instructive conclusions which are valid in different typical situations. We summarize
below our main findings of Section 3, established in the pure case (that is, agents are
either purely conformist or purely anti-conformist) and with a society of large size:
– In a society where all agents have the same influenceability characteristics, a cascade
effect leading to a polarization is likely to occur. The type of polarization depends
on the firing threshold, i.e., the proportion of ‘yes’ which is necessary to start being
influenced. If the firing threshold is low, then all conformist agents will finally say
‘yes’, while if the firing threshold is high, the cascade effect leads all conformists to
say ‘no’. This cascade phenomena happen even with a very small number of anti-
conformists, and tend to be blurred by a chaotic behavior if the proportion of anti-
conformists becomes large. It shows a very important fact: the opinion of a society
can be manipulated by introducing a small proportion of anti-conformists in it (opinion
reversal). Hence, anti-conformists do not only introduce chaotic behavior, they can
steer the opinion in some direction.
– When agents have a symmetric behavior w.r.t. ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in terms of influenceability,
no cascade phenomenon can occur, and a chaotic behavior is very likely. A polarization
can occur however, if the anti-conformists are not “seen” by the conformists (i.e., their
number stays below the firing threshold), and all the more since the anti-conformists
are reactive.
– When the proportion of anti-conformists becomes very small, and if they are not
“seen” by the conformists, then the situation is as if there were no anti-conformists
at all (this shows a kind of continuity property of the model). If on the contrary they
can be seen, some cascade effect is possible (precisely, only if either la or ra is smaller
than the proportion of anti-conformists).
– Lastly we mention a special situation similar to a triple point in physics: the three types
of behavior (polarization, fuzzy polarization and cycle) coexist. This can happen if and
only if half of the population is anti-conformist and the firing threshold of conformists
and anti-conformists is equal to 1/2.
The introduction of mixed agents has clear effects on opinion formation. Mixed agents
do not change the number of possible absorbing classes, but their presence blurs them,
because the opinion of mixed agents always oscillate between conformism and anti-
conformism. This means that neither Na nor N c can appear as absorbing states or be a
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constituent of an absorbing class, but they are replaced by their blurred version, where
any subset of mixed agents can be present. As a consequence, polarization stricto sensu
cannot appear anymore.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Our strategy is based on (F6): aperiodic absorbing classes are connected collections S such
that S
1
→ S. Periodic absorbing classes are of the form S1
1
→ · · ·
1
→ Sp with all Si pairwise
incomparable, and S1∪· · ·∪Sp is connected. Consequently, we study all possible kinds of
transition S
1
→ T , and check connectedness for each candidate. We distinguish between
“simple” transitions of the type B
1
→ B′ with B,B′ ∈ B, and “multiple” transitions
S
1
→ T , where S, T are composed with several elements of B, e.g., [∅, Na] ∪ [∅, N c].
A.1 Simple transitions
We focus on transitions of the type B
1
→ B′, with B,B′ ∈ B, and look for conditions on
the parameters of the model to obtain such transitions.
Observe that if B′ is a nontrivial interval, it cannot be the union of other elements of
B. Therefore, B
1
→ B′ if and only if for any S ∈ B, S
1
→ B′′ with B′′ ∈ B and B′′ ⊆ B′,
and there is at least one S ∈ B s.t. S
1
→ B′. Let us denote by C[B] the conditions on
s = |S| to have a sure transition from S to B, as given in Table 1. All these conditions
are intervals.
Observe that all B ∈ B are either singletons {B} or nontrivial intervals [B,B], and
B ⊂ B′ if and only if B = {B′} or {B′}, with B′ = [B′, B′]. Hence:
B
1
→ B′ ⇔
{
[b, b] ⊆ C[B′] ∪ C[{B′}] ∪ C[{B′}]
[b, b] ∩ C[B′] 6= ∅,
(18)
with b, b the cardinalities of B,B. Let us apply (18) to all possibilities. When {B′} is a
singleton, the above condition reduces to [b, b] ⊆ C[B′], as given in Table 1. Otherwise,
(i) with B′ = [∅, Na], we obtain [b, b] ⊆ [0, lc] and [b, b] ∩ ]la, n− ra[ ∩ [0, lc] 6= ∅, which
simplifies to
[b, b] ⊆ [0, lc] and [b, b] ∩ ]la, n− ra[ 6= ∅; (19)
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(ii) with B′ = [∅, N c], we obtain
[b, b] ⊆ [n− ra, n] and [b, b] ∩ ]lc, n− rc[ 6= ∅; (20)
(iii) with B′ = [N c, N ], we obtain
[b, b] ⊆ [n− rc, n] and [b, b] ∩ ]la, n− ra[ 6= ∅; (21)
(iv) with B′ = [Na, N ], we obtain
[b, b] ⊆ [0, la] and [b, b] ∩ ]lc, n− rc[ 6= ∅. (22)
This yields Table 3. Observe that the table is symmetric w.r.t. its center by the symmetry
principle (Lemma 1): just exchange r with l. The transitions being sure, all cases on each
line are exclusive.
From Table 3, we can deduce absorbing classes reduced to singletons or intervals: they
correspond to transitions S
1
→ S in the table, provided they are connected. We obtain:
(i) Na, under the condition nc ≥ (n− lc) ∨ (n− la);
(ii) N c, under the condition nc ≥ (n− rc) ∨ (n− ra);
(iii) [∅, Na], under the condition n− lc ≤ nc < n− la;
(iv) [N c, N ], under the condition n− rc ≤ nc < n− ra.
We check connectedness for (iii) ((iv) follows by symmetry). We see from Table 1 that
every S ∈ [∅, Na] with s ≤ la has a sure transition to Na, while the other ones go to every
set in the interval. Therefore, the interval is connected if and only if Na has a possible
transition to every set in the interval, i.e., we need la < na < n− ra and na ≤ lc, so the
additional condition na < n− ra is needed. In summary:
(i) Na is an absorbing class if and only if nc ≥ (n− lc) ∨ (n− la);
(ii) N c is an absorbing class if and only if nc ≥ (n− rc) ∨ (n− ra);
(iii) [∅, Na] is an absorbing class if and only if (n− lc) ∨ (ra + 1) ≤ nc < n− la;
(iv) [N c, N ] is an absorbing class if and only if (n− rc) ∨ (la + 1) ≤ nc < n− ra.
In order to get (absorbing) cycles and periodic classes, we study chains of sure transi-
tions of length 2: S1
1
→ S2
1
→ S3, with S1,S2,S3 being pairwise disjoint, except possibly
S1 = S3. An inspection of Table 3 yields all such possible chains of length 2, summarized
in Table 4. A second table can be obtained by symmetry.
From Table 4, we obtain the following candidates for absorbing cycles and periodic
classes, after eliminating double occurrences and using symmetry:
(i) Na
1
→ ∅
1
→ Na, under the condition n− lc ≤ nc ≤ ra;
(ii) N c
1
→ N
1
→ N c, under the condition n− rc ≤ nc ≤ la;
(iii) N c
1
→ Na
1
→ N c, under the condition nc ≤ lc ∧ la ∧ rc ∧ ra;
(iv) [∅, N c]
1
→ Na
1
→ [∅, N c], under the condition nc ≤ lc ∧ la ∧ ra, rc < nc < n− lc
(v) [Na, N ]
1
→ N c
1
→ [Na, N ], under the condition nc ≤ rc ∧ ra ∧ la, lc < nc < n− rc
(vi) [Na, N ]
1
→ [∅, N c]
1
→ [Na, N ], under the condition rc ∨ lc < nc ≤ ra ∧ la.
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It remains to check connectedness of (iv) and (vi) ((v) is obtained by symmetry). For
(iv), we must check that Na has a possible transition to every set in [∅, N c]. By Table 1,
we must have na ≥ n− ra and lc < na < n − rc, which is true by the conditions in (iv).
We address (vi). We claim that under the conditions in (vi) [Na, N ]∪ [∅, N c] is connected
if and only if Na
1
→ [∅, N c] and N c
1
→ [Na, N ]. Take any S ∈ [∅, N c]. Then S goes
either to any set T in [Na, N ] or only to Na or only to N . In the first case, similarly,
T goes either to any set S ′ ∈ [∅, N c] (and we are done) or only to ∅ or only to N c. If
T
1
→ ∅, then we have T
1
→ ∅
1
→ Na
1
→ [∅, N c] and we are done. Otherwise we have
T
1
→ N c → Na
1
→ [∅, N c]. Suppose now that S
1
→ Na, then Na goes to any S ′ ∈ [∅, N c]
and we are done. Otherwise, S
1
→ N
1
→ N c → Na
1
→ [∅, N c] and we are done. This proves
sufficiency. Now suppose the condition is not fulfilled. This means that Na goes to either
∅ or N c (or similar condition for N c). In fact, due to the conditions in (vi) and Table 1,
we have that Na
1
→ ∅, but this yields the cycle Na
1
→ ∅
1
→ Na.
So in summary, candidates from (i) to (v) are all periodic classes under the specified
conditions, and for (vi), the additional condition that Na
1
→ [∅, N c] and N c
1
→ [Na, N ]
yields:
(vi’) [Na, N ]
1
→ [∅, N c]
1
→ [Na, N ] under the condition rc ∨ lc < nc ≤ ra ∧ la ∧ (n− lc− 1)∧
(n− rc − 1).
For cycles and periodic classes of length 3, by combining the possible chains of length
2 of Table 4 with possible transitions of Table 3, we have only one candidate, all other
being eliminated because the collections are not disjoint:
N c
1
→ ∅
1
→ Na
1
→ N c.
Hence we find, taking into account the symmetry, two additional cycles:
(i) N c
1
→ ∅
1
→ Na
1
→ N c, under the condition nc ≤ rc ∧ ra ∧ lc, nc ≥ n− ra;
(ii) Na
1
→ N
1
→ N c
1
→ Na, under the condition nc ≤ lc ∧ la ∧ rc, nc ≥ n− la.
We now show that periodic classes of period greater than three cannot exist, which
finishes the study of simple transitions.
Lemma 2 There exists no periodic class of period k ≥ 4.
Proof. Let S be a periodic class. First, observe that if ∅, N are not elements of S, it is
not possible to choose four distinct elements of B \ {{∅}, {N}} such that these elements
are pairwise disjoint. Hence, we suppose that there are transitions B
1
→ ∅ and/or B
1
→ N
in S. From Table 3, we see that B is necessarily {Na} or {N c}.
We claim that the cycle ∅
1
−→ Na
1
−→ N
1
−→ N c
1
−→ ∅ is impossible. Indeed, by Table 4,
we have ∅
1
−→ Na
1
−→ N iff n − la ≤ nc ≤ rc and N
1
−→ N c
1
−→ ∅ (its symmetric) iff
n− ra ≤ nc ≤ lc. This yields, respectively,
2nc ≥ 2n− la − ra > n
2nc ≤ rc + lc < n,
a contradiction.
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Assume that we have a transition to ∅ (the case for N is obtained by symmetry). We
have either Na
1
→ ∅ (which is discarded because it leads to the cycle Na
1
→ ∅
1
→ Na) or
N c
1
→ ∅. Then, the only possible absorbing class of the form N c
1
−→ ∅
1
−→ Na
1
−→ B1
1
−→
· · ·
1
−→ Bp
1
−→ N c is the cycle ∅
1
−→ Na
1
−→ N c
1
−→ ∅, for, either B1 = N , and we obtain the
impossible cycle in the claim above, or B1 contains N
a or N c, which is impossible since
elements in S should be pairwise disjoint. ⊓⊔
A.2 Multiple transitions
We examine the case of transitions of the form S
1
→ B1∪· · ·∪Bp, with p ≥ 2, S ∈ 2
N and
formed only from sets in B, B1, . . . ,Bp ∈ B, and all B1, . . . ,Bp are pairwise incomparable
by inclusion5. The analysis is done in the same way as for simple transitions: the above
transition exists if and only if for every S ∈ S, S
1
→ B′ with B′ ∈ B and B′ ⊆ B1∪· · ·∪Bp
and there exist distinct S1, . . . , Sp ∈ S such that Sj
1
→ Bj for j = 1, . . . , p, which readily
shows that S cannot be a singleton. More explicitly, using previous notation and denoting
by supp(S) = {|S| : S ∈ S} the support of S, we get:
S
1
→ B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bp ⇔


supp(S) ⊆
p⋃
j=1
C[Bj ] ∪
p⋃
j=1
C[{Bj}] ∪
p⋃
j=1
C[{Bj}]
supp(S) ∩ C[Bj ] 6= ∅, j = 1, . . . , p.
(23)
Let us investigate what the possible candidates for B1∪· · ·∪Bp are. We begin by restricting
to nontrivial intervals and p = 2. From Table 1, we find:
(i) S
1
→ [∅, Na] ∪ [∅, N c] if and only if
supp(S) ⊆ [0, lc] ∪ [n− ra, n] and
{
supp(S) ∩ ]la, n− ra[ ∩ [0, lc] 6= ∅
supp(S) ∩ ]lc, n− rc[ ∩ [n− ra, n] 6= ∅
; (24)
(ii) S
1
→ [∅, Na] ∪ [N c, N ] if and only if
supp(S) ⊆ [0, lc] ∪ [n− rc, n] and
{
supp(S) ∩ ]la, n− ra[ ∩ [0, lc] 6= ∅
supp(S) ∩ ]la, n− ra[ ∩ [n− rc, n] 6= ∅
; (25)
(iii) S
1
→ [Na, N ] ∪ [∅, N c] if and only if
supp(S) ⊆ [0, la] ∪ [n− ra, n] and
{
supp(S) ∩ ]lc, n− rc[ ∩ [0, la] 6= ∅
supp(S) ∩ ]lc, n− rc[ ∩ [n− ra, n] 6= ∅
; (26)
(iv) S
1
→ [Na, N ] ∪ [N c, N ] if and only if
supp(S) ⊆ [0, la] ∪ [n− rc, n] and
{
supp(S) ∩ ]lc, n− rc[ ∩ [0, la] 6= ∅
supp(S) ∩ ]la, n− ra[ ∩ [n− rc, n] 6= ∅
, (27)
5 The “∪” is understood at the level of collections of sets, i.e., B1 ∪ B2 = {S ∈ 2
N | S ∈ B1 or S ∈ B2}.
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the other combinations [∅, Na] ∪ [Na, N ] and [∅, N c] ∪ [N c, N ] being impossible as it can
be checked. This readily shows that p > 2 with nontrivial intervals is impossible since a
forbidden combination would appear in the list.
We consider now that singletons may appear. We begin by noticing that there is no
absorbing class of the form {S1, . . . , Sp} with Sj ∈ {∅, N,N
a, N c} for all j and p ≥ 2.
Indeed, Table 3 shows that transitions from a set S can only lead to a single T , with no
possibility of multiple transition. Hence, such collections would never be connected.
Let us examine the case S
1
→ B1 ∪ {S}, where B1 is a nontrivial interval. With
[∅, Na] ∪ {N} we obtain:
supp(S) ⊆ [0, lc] ∪ ([0, la] ∩ [n− rc, n]) and
{
supp(S) ∩ [0, lc] ∩ ]la, n− ra[ 6= ∅
supp(S) ∩ [0, la] ∩ [n− rc, n] 6= ∅
,
which is impossible. With [∅, Na] ∪ {N c} we obtain
supp(S) ⊆ [0, lc]∪([n−ra, n]∩[n−rc, n]) and
{
supp(S) ∩ [0, lc] ∩ ]la, n− ra[ 6= ∅
supp(S) ∩ [n− rc, n] ∩ [n− ra, n] 6= ∅
,
(28)
which is possible. Similarly, we find that [∅, N c] ∪ {N}, [Na, N ] ∪ {∅} and [N c, N ] ∪ {∅}
are impossible, while the following are possible:
(i) S
1
→ [∅, N c] ∪ {Na} iff
supp(S) ⊆ [n−ra, n]∪([0, la]∩ [0, lc]) and
{
supp(S) ∩ [n− ra, n] ∩ ]lc, n− rc[ 6= ∅
supp(S) ∩ [0, la] ∩ [0, lc] 6= ∅
,
(29)
(ii) S
1
→ [Na, N ] ∪ {N c} iff
supp(S) ⊆ [0, la]∪([n−ra, n]∩[n−rc, n]) and
{
supp(S) ∩ [0, la] ∩ ]lc, n− rc[ 6= ∅
supp(S) ∩ [n− ra, n] ∩ [n− rc, n] 6= ∅
,
(30)
(iii) S
1
→ [N c, N ] ∪ {Na} iff
supp(S) ⊆ [n−rc, n]∪([0, la]∩ [0, lc]) and
{
supp(S) ∩ [n− rc, n] ∩ ]la, n− ra[ 6= ∅
supp(S) ∩ [0, la] ∩ [0, lc] 6= ∅
.
(31)
This shows that transitions of the form S
1
→ B ∪ {S1} ∪ {S2} are not possible since a
forbidden configuration would appear.
We are now in position to study aperiodic absorbing classes.
(i) With S = [∅, Na] ∪ [∅, N c], we find from (24) that
[0, na ∨ nc] ⊆ [0, lc] ∪ [n− ra, n] and
{
[0, na ∨ nc] ∩ ]la, n− ra[ ∩ [0, lc] 6= ∅
[0, na ∨ nc] ∩ ]lc, n− rc[ ∩ [n− ra, n] 6= ∅
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which is equivalent to
na ∨ nc > lc ≥ n− ra. (32)
We check connectedness. We begin by a simple observation. We have ∅
1
→ Na, therefore
we must forbid the transitions Na
1
→ ∅ and Na
1
→ Na. Using Table 1 and (32), we find
that na ∈ ]la, n− ra[ ∪ ]lc, n[. Suppose that na ∈ ]la, n− ra[. From Table 1, we obtain
that Na
1
→ [∅, Na]
1
→ [∅, Na], hence no connection to [∅, N c] is obtained. Therefore we
are forced to consider na ∈ ]lc, n[, which with (32) leads to
na > lc ≥ n− ra. (33)
From Table 1 again, this implies Na
1
→ [∅, N c] when na ∈ ]lc, n− rc[, or Na
1
→ N c
when na ∈ [n− rc, n[. We distinguish the two cases.
1. Suppose na ∈ ]lc, n− rc[, so we have ∅
1
→ Na
1
→ [∅, N c]. In order to connect
∅, Na to any set in ]∅, Na[, there must exist S ∈ [∅, N c] such that S
1
→ [∅, Na], i.e.,
s ∈ ]la, n− ra[ ∩ [0, lc] = ]la, n− ra[ by (33). This is possible iff nc > la. Let us check
whether N c is connected to any set in the class. From Table 1 and the condition
nc > la, we see that there is a possible transition to ∅, which suffices to prove that N c
is connected to any set in the class, except if nc ∈ [n− rc, n] in which case N c
1
→ N c.
Therefore, we must ensure the following condition:
nc ∈ ]la, n− rc[ . (34)
We check similarly whether any other set in the class is connected with the rest. Take
S ∈ ]∅, Na[. If s ≤ lc, there will be either a possible transition to ∅ or to Na, so that
S is connected to any set in the class. If s > lc, S behaves like Na and we are done.
Take now S ∈ ]∅, N c[. If s ≤ la, then S
1
→ Na and we are done. If s ∈ ]la, lc], S has a
possible transition to ∅ and we are done. Finally, if s ∈ ]lc, n− rc[, S behaves like N c.
In conclusion, (34) summarizes the condition for connectedness in Case 1.
2. Suppose na ∈ [n− rc, n[, so we have ∅
1
→ Na
1
→ N c. We must ensure that N c is
connected to any set in the class. In order to avoid N c
1
→ N c and the transitions
N c
1
→ Na and N c
1
→ ∅ which would lead to cycles, we are left with the cases nc ∈
]la, n− ra[ (yielding N c
1
→ [∅, Na]) and nc ∈ ]lc, n− rc[ (yielding N c
1
→ [∅, N c]). We
examine both cases.
2.1. Suppose nc ∈ ]la, n− ra[, then we have N c
1
→ [∅, Na]. It remains to ensure that
there exists S ∈ ]∅, Na[ which is connected with [∅, N c]. We must have s ∈ ]lc, n− rc[,
always possible under Case 2. So we have established that ∅, Na, N c are connected
with the rest of the class. It remains to check if this is true for the other sets in the
class. Take S ∈ ]∅, Na[. If s ≤ lc, a transition to ∅ of Na is possible, and so we are
done. If s ∈ ]lc, n[, then S → N c, and we are done. Take now S ∈ ]∅, N c[. Then
s ∈ ]0, n− ra[, so that S → Na and we are done. As a conclusion, connectedness
holds when nc ∈ ]la, n− ra[.
2.2. Suppose nc ∈ ]lc, n− rc[, then N c
1
→ [∅, N c]. It remains to connect some set S
in ]∅, N c[ to [∅, Na], which is possible iff s ∈ ]la, n− ra[. This is possible under Case
2, so N c is connected to any set in the class. We check for the remaining sets. Take
S ∈ ]∅, Na[. If s ≤ lc, a connection is possible to Na or ∅ so we are done. Otherwise,
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a connection to N c is possible and we are done. For S ∈ ]∅, N c[, it works exactly the
same.
In conclusion of Case 2, connectedness is ensured iff nc ∈ ]la, n− ra[ ∪ ]lc, n− rc[.
There does not seem to be a simple way to write the final condition. Here is one
possible: connectedness holds iff lc ≥ n− ra and
nc ∈
(
]rc, n− lc[ ∩ ]la, n− rc[
)
∪
((
]la, n− ra[ ∪ ]lc, n− rc[
)
∩ ]0, rc]
)
.
(ii) Similarly, using (25), S = [Na, N ] ∪ [N c, N ] is an absorbing class if and only if la ≥
n− rc and nc ∈
(
]lc, n− rc[ ∩ ]ra, n− lc[
)
∪
((
]ra, n− la[ ∪ ]rc, n− lc[
)
∩ ]0, lc]
)
.
(iii) With S = [∅, N c] ∪ [Na, N ] we find from (26) the condition lc ∨ rc < nc ≤ la ∧ ra. Let
us check connectedness. Starting from ∅, we have ∅
1
→ Na, and by Table 1 and the
above condition we have Na
1
→ [∅, N c] if na > lc, and Na
1
→ ∅ otherwise. Clearly, the
latter must be forbidden otherwise a cycle occurs. Therefore, we must have na > lc.
Moreover, we have N c
1
→ [Na, N ] if nc < n − rc and N c
1
→ N otherwise. Since
N
1
→ N c, the latter must be forbidden to avoid a cycle. Therefore, we must have
nc < n − rc. Under these condition, from ∅ or Na or N c, any set can be attained.
Now, taking S ∈ ]∅, N c[, we have S
1
→ Na or S
1
→ [Na, N ] so that S → Na and we
are done. Lastly, taking S ∈ ]Na, N [, we have S
1
→ N c or [∅, N c] and we are done. As
a conclusion, the condition is lc ∨ rc < nc ≤ la ∧ ra and nc < (n− lc) ∧ (n− rc), but
then we obtain the periodic absorbing class studied before. Indeed, we see from the
proof that we have necessarily [∅, N c]
1
→ [Na, N ]
1
→ [∅, N c].
(iv) With S = [∅, Na] ∪ [N c, N ], using (25), we find that la ∨ ra < na ≤ lc ∧ rc. Suppose
first lc + rc < n− 1. Then S cannot be connected. Indeed, starting from Na, we have
from Table 1 that for any set S ∈ [∅, Na], we have either S
1
→ Na, or S
1
→ [∅, Na] or
S
1
→ ∅. Therefore, [∅, Na] is not connected with every set in S.
Suppose now that lc + rc = n − 1. The first condition in (25) reduces to the void
condition supp(S) ⊆ [0, n]. By the second condition we deduce la < lc and n − rc <
n−ra. We check connectedness by using Table 1. We must have Na
1
→ [N c, N ], which
happens iff n−rc ≤ na < n−ra. Now, observe that for any S ∈ [∅, Na], the transition
is either in [∅, Na] or Na (when s ≤ lc), or in [N c, N ]. To ensure that [N c, N ] is
connected to [∅, Na], we must have N c
1
→ [∅, Na], which happens iff la < nc ≤ lc.
Then any set S ∈ [N c, N ] has a transition to either [∅, Na] or Na (if s ≤ lc) or to
[N c, N ] or N c. In summary, this class exists iff lc + rc = n− 1, n− rc ≤ na < n− ra
and la < nc ≤ lc.
(v) We show that [∅, Na] ∪ {N c} cannot be connected when lc + rc 6= n − 1. Indeed, we
must have N c
1
→ [∅, Na] or N c
1
→ Na, which implies by Table 1 the condition nc ≤ lc.
However, by (28) and the condition lc + rc 6= n− 1, supp(S) must be in two disjoint
intervals, implying that [0, na] ⊆ [0, lc] and nc ∈ [n− rc, n], a contradiction.
We suppose now lc+ rc = n−1 and n− ra ≤ n− rc, so that in (28) the first condition
reduces to the void condition supp(S) ⊆ [0, n]. Observe that the second condition
implies lc > la. To ensure connectedness, we must have a transition from Na to N c,
which happens iff na ≥ n − rc. Also, we must ensure N c
1
→ [∅, Na], which happens
iff la < nc < n − ra. Finally, we must ensure that any S ∈ [∅, Na] is such that either
S
1
→ N c or S
1
→ [∅, Na] or S
1
→ Na. The two latter transitions arise when s ≤ lc,
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while the former transition arises when s ≥ n − rc. Since n − rc = lc + 1, no other
transition can happen. Connectedness is then proved. Finally, it can be checked that
the second condition in (28) is satisfied. In summary, this class exists iff lc+rc = n−1,
n− ra ≤ n− rc, lc > la, na ≥ n− rc and la < nc < n− ra.
(vi) With [∅, N c] ∪ {Na}, we find from (29) and the assumption la + ra 6= n − 1 that
supp(S) must be in two disjoint intervals, which forces n − ra ≤ na < n − rc and
nc ≤ la ∧ lc. We know already that [∅, N c]
1
→ Na
1
→ [∅, N c] is a periodic class. Let us
show that this is the only possibility. Indeed, otherwise there should exist S ∈ [∅, N c]
such that S
1
→ [∅, N c]. This would imply that lc < s < n− rc, which is impossible by
the condition nc ≤ lc.
Let us consider now that la+ ra = n−1 and lc ≥ la, so that in (29) the first condition
simply reduces to the void condition supp(S) ⊆ [0, n], while the second becomes: either
na ∈ ]lc, n− rc[ or nc > lc. Let us check connectedness. We must have Na
1
→ [∅, N c]
or Na
1
→ N c. The first case happens iff na ∈ ]lc, n− rc[. Then observe that without
further condition on nc, any set in [∅, N c] is connected to either Na, ∅, [∅, N c] or N c.
It suffices then to forbid the transition N c
1
→ N c, i.e., nc < n − rc. The second case
happens iff na ≥ n − rc, which forces nc > lc. To ensure that N c is connected to
[∅, N c], we must have lc < nc < n − rc. Then any set in [∅, N c] has a transition to
either Na, ∅ or [∅, N c]. In summary, this class exists iff la + ra = n − 1, lc ≥ la, and
either na ∈ ]lc, n− rc[ and nc < n− rc, or na ≥ n− rc and lc < nc < n− rc.
(vii) The case of [Na, N ]∪{N c} is similar to its symmetric [∅, N c]∪{Na}. The class exists
iff la + ra = n− 1, n− rc ≤ n− ra, and either nc ∈ ]lc, n− rc[ and na > lc, or nc ≤ lc
and lc < na < n− rc.
(viii) The case of [N c, N ]∪{Na} is similar to its symmetric [∅, Na]∪{N c}. The class exists
iff lc + rc = n− 1, n− la ≤ n− lc, rc > ra, na ≥ n− lc and ra < nc < n− la.
It remains to study the existence of periodic classes. Since the collections must be
pairwise disjoint, the only possibility is the periodic class [∅, Na]∪[∅, N c]
1
→ N
1
→ [∅, Na]∪
[∅, N c]. But we know that the second transition is impossible since a singleton cannot
lead to a multiple transition. Hence, there are no such periodic absorbing classes.
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S\T ∅ Na [∅, Nc] [∅, Na] [Nc, N ] [Na, N ] Nc N
∅ × always × × × × × ×
Na n− lc ≤ nc ≤ ra
nc ≥ n− lc
nc ≥ n− la
nc ≤ ra
rc < nc < n− lc
nc ≥ n− lc
ra < nc < n− la
nc ≤ rc
ra < nc < n− la
nc ≥ n− la
rc < nc < n− lc
nc ≤ rc ∧ ra n− la ≤ nc ≤ rc
[∅, Nc] × nc ≤ lc ∧ la × la < nc ≤ lc × lc < nc ≤ la × ×
[∅, Na] ×
nc ≥ n− lc
nc ≥ n− la
×
n− lc ≤ nc
nc < n− la
×
n− la ≤ nc
nc < n− lc
× ×
[Nc, N ] × ×
n− ra ≤ nc
nc < n− rc
×
n− rc ≤ nc
nc < n− ra
×
nc ≥ n− rc
nc ≥ n− ra
×
[Na, N ] × × rc < nc ≤ ra × ra < nc ≤ rc × nc ≤ rc ∧ ra ×
Nc n− ra ≤ nc ≤ lc nc ≤ lc ∧ la
nc ≥ n− ra
lc < nc < n− rc
nc ≤ lc
la < nc < n− ra
nc ≥ n− rc
la < nc < n− ra
nc ≤ la
lc < nc < n− rc
nc ≥ n− rc
nc ≥ n− ra
n− rc ≤ nc ≤ la
N × × × × × × always ×
Table 3. Conditions for sure transitions S to T
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Na
1
→ ∅
1
→ Na n− lc ≤ nc ≤ ra
Nc
1
→ ∅
1
→ Na n− ra ≤ nc ≤ lc
∅
1
→ Na
1
→ [Nc, N ]
nc ≤ rc
ra < nc < n− la
∅
1
→ Na
1
→ Nc nc ≤ rc ∧ ra
∅
1
→ Na
1
→ N n− la ≤ nc ≤ rc
Nc
1
→ Na
1
→ ∅ n− lc ≤ nc ≤ lc ∧ la ∧ ra
[∅, Nc]
1
→ Na
1
→ [∅, Nc]
nc ≤ lc ∧ la ∧ ra
rc < nc < n− lc
Nc
1
→ Na
1
→ Nc nc ≤ lc ∧ la ∧ rc ∧ ra
Nc or [∅, Nc]
1
→ Na
1
→ N n− la ≤ nc ≤ la ∧ lc ∧ rc
Na
1
→ [∅, Nc]
1
→ Na
nc ≤ la ∧ lc ∧ ra
rc < nc < n− lc
[Na, N ]
1
→ [∅, Nc]
1
→ [Na, N ] lc ∨ rc < nc ≤ ra ∧ la
Table 4. Conditions for chains of length 2 potentially yielding periodic classes
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